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As traditional legacy systems that run critical national infras-
tructures (CNI) are increasingly digitized for performance
monitoring and efficiency, significant attention has been
brought to improving their cyber security. Network and Infor-
mation Systems Security (NIS) Directive is the first European-
scale attempt to establish a high standard of cyber security
among CNIs. NIS raises questions about defining scope, pro-
viding evidence or mobilizing funding. Most importantly,
there is the fundamental question whether it would become a
tick-box exercise or lead to long-term improvements in secu-
rity practices. We interviewed 30 cyber security practitioners
in the UK to gather an in-depth understanding of NIS imple-
mentation and its probable futures. Our analysis found that
the emerging field of Operational Technology Security is yet
to formulate norms, standards and career trajectories. We are,
therefore, at a critical junction, where the scope of the pro-
fession is shaping together with the need for evidence-based
policy advice. Our findings are twofold: (1) a number of se-
curity tropes (e.g., “security solutions are the same across
the sectors”), which may drive implementation of regulations
such as NIS; (2) a classification of cyber security practices
mapping the diversity of policy interpretations. We conclude
with recommendations for policymakers and CNI operators.
1 Introduction
Critical National Infrastructures (CNIs) are facilities and
systems essential for a country to function. While the exact
scope is up for a political decision, sectors like water, energy,
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transport, defense, health, emergency services would typically
be designated as CNIs. However, not all components of these
sectors are deemed critical, for example, current policy advice
focuses on protecting systems where a major detrimental
impact on the delivery of services could pose serious threats
to human life or compromise national security [31].
Critical infrastructures are supported by the Operational
Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) systems.
Some examples of IT systems are billing software, staff in-
tranet or data servers, however, their criticality depends on the
organizational context. Meanwhile, OT is defined as hardware
and software used to monitor and control physical equipment
like pumps or valves [24]. Some example systems and devices
used in OT environments include: 1) Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA): control network architecture used
for monitoring assets over large geographical areas; 2) Pro-
grammable Logic Controllers (PLC): industrial computers
built to endure harsh conditions and provide strong safety and
real-time properties; 3) Telemetry, or sensors communicat-
ing using radio, infrared or cellular networks; 4) Actuators,
components which drive the actual physical process based on
commands from PLCs. Experts working in the Operational
Technology environment would typically have an engineering
background, with specialization in control, networks or safety
processes. In the absence of university education, OT special-
ists would progress in their careers starting from blue-collar
roles like technician and plant operator [48].
For decades, OT systems have been limited to basic func-
tionalities, however, with increased digitization and the advent
of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), they modernize at
an unprecedented scale. One of the reasons for the slow pace
of technological advancement in Operational Technology is
the strict regulatory environment of the critical infrastructure
operators which prioritizes safety. However, the most recent
generation of OT devices promises not only improvements in
safety but also efficiency and monitoring, e.g., automatic leak
detection in water systems or increasing flexibility of energy
networks [15, 18, 23]. Yet, reports of recent attacks on critical
infrastructures show that securing OT systems from cyber
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attacks still remains a challenge (see analyses of Triton [29]
and the Ukrainian power grid attack [21]).
OT security is much younger than its IT counterpart, and
its concerns, traditions and feasible solutions cannot exactly
translate from IT security due to the differences in mate-
rial and regulatory arrangements. Furthermore, a significant
knowledge gap exists in terms of OT cyber security best prac-
tices [74]. Although the differences between OT and IT
security are still poorly understood, protecting Operational
Technology environments is a priority for nation-states due
to their strategic importance and role in delivering essential
services [19]. Therefore, the regulations and standards inform-
ing the design of OT systems require special attention from
security researchers and practitioners.
In order to investigate the interactions between regulations
and innovation, we turn to the Network and Information Sys-
tems Security Directive (NIS). NIS is the first European-scale
attempt to regulate and stimulate the development of cyber
security in CNIs [2]. The directive asked each complying
government to identify sectors in scope of the policy. The
designated industries are considered essential to human life
and exposed to cyber security incidents. As such, there is a
number of Operational Technologies within the scope of NIS,
which have not been previously dealt with by other digital
regulations (i.e. General Data Protection Regulations).
The development of new regulations in the field of emerg-
ing technologies raises questions about defining scope, pro-
viding appropriate evidence, mobilizing funding and, finally,
implementing policy [25]. Consequently, two questions about
the possible futures of NIS need to be answered:
• What responses to NIS are likely to bring about mean-
ingful organizational change?
• How can NIS avoid being reduced to a tick-box exercise?
While we cannot predict the future, we can anticipate a
range of potential outcomes by investigating how OT security
practitioners gain their expertise, and how they then apply it
to policy interpretation and implementation. We interviewed
30 cyber security practitioners based in the United Kingdom,
asking about their experiences of the evolving cyber security
policy landscape in the context of critical infrastructures. The
research project was guided by the following questions:
RQ1. How is the knowledge of OT security created?
RQ2. How do CNI operators interpret and implement cyber
security regulations?
RQ3. What OT security practices can be observed as a result
of these regulations?
We addressed the above questions in the context of NIS
Regulations, as implemented in our case study country, the
United Kingdom. Our questions were motivated by the in-
terest in the emerging profession and the act of collective
“sense-making” of the unprecedented policy. We argue that
only by understanding the practitioners and practices on the
ground we can establish whether and how security may be
advanced as a result of regulations such as NIS. Our work is
among the first to investigate organizational and practitioner
responses to NIS. The novel contributions of our work are as
follows:
We identify four Operational Technology (OT) security
tropes which could influence the implementation of OT se-
curity regulations: “separation means security”, “IIoT is in-
evitable”, “security solutions are the same across the sectors”,
“raising awareness leads to security”. In these four tropes
encountered, the notion of cyber security was equated with
solely individual or technological capability. We propose that
organizational and political dimensions of security should re-
ceive its due regard in the debate. Our analysis of these tropes
acts as a call to shape the trajectory of professionalization in
this field. We recommend that practitioners who encounter
OT security tropes should seek robust evidence and ensure
that these statements are appropriately translated to the OT
and sector-specific context before being circulated.
We propose a classification of Operational Technology
cyber security practices which maps the diversity of policy
responses and interpretations. We analyze these practices in
conjunction with OT security tropes to indicate how practi-
tioners’ understanding of NIS could lead to more security or
more insecurity. In doing so, we provide a set of recommen-
dations for policymakers and critical infrastructure operators.
Finally, we set the agenda for further research on the emerging
field of OT security.
2 Related Work
2.1 (Supra)national policy or legislation on
CNI cyber protection
Directive (EU) 2016/1148 [2] on establishing a high level
of security of Network and Information Systems (NIS), com-
monly referred to as the “NIS Directive”, is the European Par-
liament’s effort to improve network and information systems
security across the European Union (EU). The NIS Directive
has been mentioned as a motivating factor for organizations to
improve their cyber security processes (cf. [5,47]). At the time
of writing (June 2020), most governments identified the pol-
icy scope, outlined implementation road maps and suggested
penalties for non-compliance [10, 51].
Significant research has been done on other European ef-
forts in unifying law addressing digital infrastructures, such
as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [28, 39].
However, despite the importance of critical infrastructures to
society, organizational and practitioner response to NIS have
so far not been investigated in depth. Maglaras et al. [49],
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for example, gave a detailed overview of challenges for the
implementation of the NIS Directive in Greece, but little work
since then has explored practitioners’ experiences of policy
implementation since different member states transposed the
directive into their respective legislations.
Meanwhile, in our case study country, the UK, Shukla,
Johnson, and Jones [64] discussed how NIS implementation
strategy addresses critical infrastructure security risks in the
UK, giving a set of ten recommendations to bridge gaps identi-
fied in the NIS framework. Their suggestions centered around
holistic security governance, outcome-based audit approach,
and progressive road map to improve cyber capabilities of the
critical infrastructure operators.
Overall, the UK is considered to be fairly mature in terms
of IT cyber security, and less so when it comes to the OT sys-
tems [64]. The government’s ambition is for the UK to grow
domestic cyber security sector and become the global cyber
security leader [20]. The potential to realize these ambitions
will depend on the governance arrangements across critical
infrastructures. Carr [19] called for sustained attention on the
emerging public-private partnerships between the operators
and the government’s regulatory bodies. Each of these partner-
ships could impact the trajectory of NIS implementation due
to varying relationships and funding arrangements between
the (energy, water, transport) operators and regulatory bodies
overseeing equipment safety and pricing regimes.
Finally, in contrast to Shukla et al., our work presents one of
the first empirical works performed during the implementation
of NIS, going into much more granular detail to the challenges
faced by those affected by NIS, allowing us to reframe what
advice remains most urgent to practitioners.
2.2 Security Practices and Behaviors
While researching policy documents is crucial to investigat-
ing cyber security regulations, implementation is ultimately
a social activity. After all, people create shared understand-
ing of secure behaviors and practices. Previous research on
human factors in cyber security focused on systematizing
the types and kinds of security behaviors. For example, there
is the mapping of employees’ information security behavior
to various levels of information security knowledge [3]. A
typology of end-user security behavior triggers is suggested,
where social triggers (i.e. interacting with, or observing other
people) are the most common types, and social interactions
in the context of security are essential to our understanding
of security-related behaviors [26, 27]. Risk perception may
also play a role in security practices, as incorrect perceptions
have been noted to play a significant part in past attacks on
CNIs [57]. Such incorrect perceptions may arise due to latent
design conditions, or improper specification of system quali-
ties, borders, observability and controllability [33], making it
difficult to reduce blame to the level of the individual. Further-
more, it is necessary to investigate the motivators and barriers
of employees’ security behaviors, paying attention to respon-
sibility, personal and work boundaries and how these differ
across various contexts [12]. To stimulate security behaviors,
people need to be positively motivated, e.g., by overcoming
negative perceptions of security through establishing trust
with audiences and addressing concerns in an honest, trans-
parent way [37]. Moreover, it would seem that one-size-fits-all
solutions to improving security are not necessarily realistic,
as different authentication methods place burdens on their
users, leading to great variations among participants’ security
approaches and implementations [50].
We argue that the response to cyber security regulations
is a result of mutual shaping between policy interpretation,
capabilities of the stakeholders and material resources avail-
able [63]. Positioning the research in the social rather than in-
dividualistic framework requires a shift from behavioral theo-
ries to the theories of practice [72]. Situated practices are “rou-
tinized and hierarchically organized human activities which
take into account material resources” [62]. Although they
are widely studied in IT and engineering [30, 71], Cavelty’s
interdisciplinary literature review [22] shows that situated
practices have received limited attention in cyber security.
The practice lens encourages to trace how tacit knowledge,
circulation of norms and evolving technological capabilities
influence each other to shape “what people do” and “how
people are”. Finally, this focus emphasizes that “security best
practices” found in industry guidelines and regulations, when
performed in the real-world context, can sometimes lead to
the unexpected instances of insecurity [22]. For this reason, it
is crucial to understand the difference between “best practices”
on paper (i.e. in NIS guidelines) and situated practices found
during policy implementation process.
2.3 Differences between IT and OT security
As typical information technology (IT) and operational
technology (OT) solutions differ in hardware and software,
securing them necessarily does so too. The protection of OT
systems from cyber attacks is increasingly important [38, 69];
below we outline how the typical concerns and favored solu-
tions in OT systems differ from the IT (Table 1). It is worth
noting that OT security measures are not as established as IT
measures, therefore, their efficacy is still under debate [46,56].
Security behaviors in OT systems may thus also be an en-
tirely different beast from IT systems, as the varying demands
of different stakeholders represent many complexities that
place OT security into a gray area, with security workers hav-
ing to balance competing and complex demands [74]. CNIs
which fall under NIS operate both OT and IT systems. This
further emphasizes the need to study differences between the
security practices in IT and OT context, so that we understand
what support practitioners require.
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Table 1: Differences between IT and OT systems and typical
security measures ( [46, 56]).
IT SYSTEMS OT SYSTEMS 
• State of the art technology 
• Usually private enterprises  
• Priorities are: confidentiality, integrity 
and availability  
• Operated by office-based IT 
professionals 
• Legacy systems 
• Highly regulated for safety, mix of 
private and state-owned organizations 
• Priorities are: safety, reliability, 
robustness, maintainability, integrity 
and availability 
• Operated by engineers and manual 
laborer’s 
IT SECURITY OT SECURITY 
• Relevant standards: ISO270001, NIST 
Cyber Security Framework 
• Common solutions: pen testing, 
firewall, antivirus, insurance, access 
management 
• Behaviors and practices well 
documented 
• Relevant standards: IEC 62443 
• Potential solutions: patching, access 
management, firewall 




We performed a qualitative study using key informant semi-
structured interviews [44] between November 2019 and Jan-
uary 2020, interviewing 30 people across professions and
sectors to provide opinions and experiences of security in crit-
ical national infrastructures (CNIs). The study was approved
by our institutional review board.
3.1 Recruitment
We used a combination of snowball sampling [55] and pur-
posive maximum variability selection [52] attending industry
events to establish contacts (10 participants), and through
there expanding our search to mutual contacts (17 partici-
pants). Besides this, we identified a small number of partic-
ipants (3 participants) through online cold calling. Our in-
formants were cyber security practitioners who are currently
working in various CNI sectors. We stopped recruiting when
we reached a sufficient variation of sectors (e.g. energy, water,
transport) and roles (e.g. regulators, security consultants, CNI
operators) as well as data saturation, a point where consecu-
tive interviews cease to provide novel insights [32]. A basic
overview of the participants we recruited is given in Table 2.
3.2 Interview design and methodology
We used a common topic guide for the interviews, shown in
Table 3. We designed the topic guide to allow gradually build-
ing a rapport and make participants comfortable (interview
questions 1-3 in Table 3). In particular, interview questions
2 and 4 pertain to RQ1; interview questions 5 and 6 relate
to RQ2 and interview questions 3 and 7 are relevant to RQ3.
Questions were tailored to each participant to account for
differences in sectors and professions. Interviews took place
either at the participant’s organization, our institution or via
online calls. One primary researcher conducted all interviews,
Table 2: Demographic data.
# Role Sector(s)
P01 Security consultant Oil and Gas
P02 Regulator Energy
P03 Regulator Energy
P04 Security working group co-
ordinator
Energy
P05 Engineering consultant Energy
P05 Engineering consultant Energy (Civil Nuclear)
P07 Director in Engineering
consultancy
Water, Energy (Civil Nu-
clear)
P08 Security Manager at the
CNI Operator
Energy
P09 Security Trainer Defence
P10 Incident Response Director IT, Finance
P11 Security consultant IT, Finance
P12 Vendor of security product IT, Finance
P13 Lawyer IT, Finance
P14 Working group coordinator Telecoms
P15 IIOT Manufacturer Across all
P16 Security consultant Across all
P17 Business Development at
IIOT R&D
Across all
P18 Project Manager in Engi-
neering Consultancy
Across all
P19 Project manager at IIOT
R&D
Across all
P20 Security consultant Transport (Rail)
P21 Safety Engineer Transport (Rail)
P22 Human factors expert in
Engineering Consultancy
Transport
P23 Incident response for a
manufacturer
Transport
P24 Security Consultant Water
P25 Security Consultant Water
P26 Security manager at the
CNI operator
Water






which was necessary to build up rapport and trust given the
sensitive nature of participants’ work, and to allow for snow-
balling recruitment. Each interview lasted approximately 60
mins; all conversations were recorded with the interviewees’
consent. No reimbursement was given for participation.
3.3 Data coding and analysis
Interviews were transcribed using a professional service.
Transcripts were subsequently coded using NVivo software.
The coding was based on thematic analysis according to
Braun and Clarke [16], taking an inductive, open approach,
meaning that we established our themes and sub-themes based
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Table 3: Topic guide.
Topic guide for semi-structured interviews 
1. Story of OT security in your sector/organization: How did OT security look like before NIS, 
what has NIS changed in comparison? 
2. Story of your career: How did you get into security? How did your previous roles influence 
your current job? 
3. Situating security in a sector-specific context: What are the typical security concerns, 
regulations, technologies and procedures in your sector/organization? 
4. Standards and regulations: How do you apply industry standards and security policies in your 
organization? How to ensure they are applied successfully? 
5. Experiences from NIS: How do you understand NIS guidelines? What are your opinions on it? 
How have you been implementing NIS so far? 
6. Investments and innovations in your organization/sector: What are your plans for the next few 
months/years with regards to improving security? How will NIS influence your future 
investments? 
7. Communicating OT security in your organization/sector: How should we communicate across 
IT-OT divide? How should we communicate between the board members and the technical 
experts? 
 
on the most frequent and novel responses rather than fitting
participants’ opinions to pre-designed categories. We itera-
tively discussed the transcripts and the developing coding
schemata, where we focused on fostering discussion among
the authors and building towards a shared understanding of
the coded data to ensure coding quality [42]. As Barbour [7]
notes: “the degree of concordance between researchers is not
really important; what is ultimately of value is the content
of disagreements and the insights that discussion can pro-
vide for refining coding frames.” While some categories were
descriptive (e.g., notes on participants’ backgrounds and sec-
toral differences in NIS implementation), in most cases, the
act of coding reflected our analytic efforts (e.g., we coded
participants’ ways of talking which reflect IT, engineer’s or
regulator’s “worldviews”). The resulting codebook is given
in Appendix A. We grouped repeating and widely occurring
responses to represent major themes (security tropes and pol-
icy implementation practices) as well as their sub-themes. For
example, “Security tropes” were referenced 102 times across
23 participants, while policy practices were referenced 246
times across 25 participants. We noted that “security tropes”
was a worthy category of analysis, as it reflected the emerg-
ing state of Operational Technology expertise. Similarly, we
classified “policy implementation practices” to establish an
exploratory categorization system so further researchers of
NIS and other security policies could verify it against their
empirical findings.
3.4 Limitations
While we built a sample to ensure the validity of our re-
search (e.g., aiming at our sample being representative in
terms of sectors, roles and professions), we neither intend,
nor claim to offer highly generalizable results. Although the
sample includes a range of people, sectors, and professions,
the insights derived from the coding do not necessarily gen-
eralize to any of those variables, nor to the wider critical in-
frastructures context. Nevertheless, the paper provided unique
insights into NIS and its implementation. Due to the sensitive
nature of the field, an important and time-consuming part
of the recruitment process focused on gaining trust and ac-
cess to participant’s honest thoughts and reflections. This was
partially enabled by the authors’ participation in an industrial-
academic research consortium, which may have influenced
the topics participants were willing or prioritized to talk about.
4 Results and Discussion
In summary, our research found that the emerging field
of Operational Technology Security is yet to formulate pro-
fessional norms, qualification certifications and career tra-
jectories. We are, therefore, at a critical junction, where the
future of the profession is shaping together with the urgent
need for evidence-based policy advice, such as NIS directive.
Our findings are twofold: (1) a number of security tropes,
common practitioners’ generalizations about the best OT se-
curity measures (e.g., “security solutions are the same across
the sectors”); (2) a classification of cyber security practices
mapping the diversity of policy implementation (e.g. nego-
tiation, workarounds) . We analyze these practices through
the lens of security tropes to highlight whether they are likely
to bring about or hinder organizational change with regards
to security best practices. In doing so, we provide a set of
recommendations for policymakers and CNI operators.
The following section analyzes the results in detail. We first
provide a demographic description of participants and outline
our findings on the professionalization of Operational Tech-
nology security. Then, we analyze the four security tropes
widely discussed in the context of NIS implementation. Fi-
nally, we propose a classification of policy implementation
practices and illustrate how they could lead to security or in-
security. Combining results and discussion demonstrates how
a direct dialogue between empirics and theory can advance
the field of Operational Technology security as a whole.
4.1 New regulations, new roles
NIS itself mobilized the OT security expertise, with new
roles created to enable implementation of cyber security poli-
cies. For example, all 5 regulators joined their organizations
no earlier than 6 months before the interview date. We ob-
served that some participants anticipated that future recruit-
ment might prove difficult as “one of the biggest challenges
is to scale up resources and to go to the market, especially in
OT. There is a really, really, really, really limited number of
specialists” [P03]. Therefore, we argue that NIS both creates
the skills gap, by prioritizing the need for a new type of ex-
pertise as well as fills the gap by unlocking investment in new
staff.
According to our participants, OT cyber security is a rel-
atively new concept: during the interviews participants fre-
quently remarked that they “worked in cyber security back
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when there was no such thing as cyber security” [P27]. To
understand how participants’ professional experience built
their present expertise, we charted the diversity of informants’
backgrounds in Figures 1 (length of relevant experience) and
2 (education). In the absence of OT security-specific degrees,
participants often studied computer science, information se-
curity or engineering. In terms of professional experience,
interviewees’ past roles were largely technical, with only 4
participants having at least 3 years of experience in human




















OT security Engineering IT security Human and Social Factors in Technology
Figure 1: Length of relevant experience – each bar on X axis
represents a participant. Y axis corresponds to the cumula-
tive years of relevant experience. X axis is anonymized, and
participants are represented in a random order.















Figure 2: Participants’ education. N.B. Some participants
obtained more than 1 qualification.
Despite the burgeoning of accreditations and certifications,
some participants remain skeptical about their value: “You
look at an individual course and that might be $6,000, and
then you realize that’s only a small part of it and you need an-
other seven modules, so that ends up $40,000 for a certificate.
Should you be spending that much money on certification or
should you be going out and helping the industry in doing
better and learning more?” [P16]. Drawing from participants’
skepticism about the current cyber security education, we
contend that the pathway to professional recognition is not
clear.
Across the participants’ pool, we observed considerable lat-
eral movement across CNI sectors (e.g., from water to energy),
with 24 participants working for more than one CNI sector in
their careers. In particular, the defense sector was a notable
employer of security experts, as it features in the working
history of 8 interviewees. More than half of participants (18)
moved across organization types (e.g., from the private sector
to the public sector). This could partially explain reports on
the OT professionals shortages [40], where the skills gap is
shifted from one sector to another rather than tackled with a
systematic effort to train new professionals.
4.2 OT Security Tropes
Our main finding suggests that the state of OT security
professionalization observed at the time of data collection is
characterized by a combination of the following factors:
1. Increasing pressure to recruit experts;
2. Lack of established and “typical” career trajectory;
3. A need for professional education and guidelines.
As the question of NIS implementation is positioned in the
center of this “trilemma”, we risk that poorly evidenced and
OT-inappropriate advice will be circulated to influence key
security decisions.
We examined the instances where participants discussed
OT security tropes. We define them as widely held beliefs
which require a further level of detail before they can be suc-
cessfully applied to the OT context. Due to the combination of
rhetorical qualities like generalization, ambiguity and strong
normativity, they lead to the creation of advice which can
be easily marketed at mass scale [9]. As they’re quite vague,
they can appeal to professionals from diverse backgrounds.
We argue that participants held a variety of opinions on “the
best OT security practices”. This reflects the diverse levels of
sophistication when it comes to practitioners’ understanding
of organizational, social and political contingencies of NIS
implementation. As the social science studies of expertise
suggest, it is crucial to understand these tropes in order to
aid professionalization of the industry and effective policy
implementation [61].
As previous research on cyber security expertise demon-
strated, “translating” security knowledge form IT to OT is
not only a matter of IT experts learning engineering [70]. We
first ought to enquire: who believes in these tropes and why?
Then, we ought to pay attention to people and organizations
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benefiting from the circulation of OT security tropes by ask-
ing: who makes a profit of it? Whose security “solutions” fit
the stereotypes? Finally, we should bear in mind: what other
measures are overlooked as a result?
4.2.1 Separation means security
Interviewees discussed the feasibility of security measures.
In particular, “air-gapping” received considerable (both pos-
itive and negative) attention. Air-gapping employs physical
separation of secure computer networks from the unsecured
ones (e.g. public Internet, local area network). Traditionally,
air-gapping has been applied to critical infrastructures due to
the low level of digitization prevalent among their OT sys-
tems.
However, the current state-of-the-art attack methods are
sophisticated enough to deal with air-gapped systems, with
the most well-known (at least to the security practitioners)
example being Stuxnet [59]. Yet, outside the OT security bub-
ble, the conversations could look different, e.g., one of our
participants recalled difficulties when convincing senior man-
agement that “air gapping” does not ensure security: “When
you’re talking to the board and they say, “We don’t need to
worry about security because our production facility is air-
gapped”, there is only one place which is air gapped and that
is Battlestar Galactica!” [P01].
Debunking air-gapping is justified not only with the ad-
vancements in threats, but also with participants frequently
predicting that OT systems will continue to become more
IT-like, for example through implementing IT-standard net-
work protocols in OT devices or migrating data to the Cloud.
Although technologically feasible, IT-OT blending is not
adopted across CNI sectors at the same rate due to the cur-
rent regulatory constraints, such as the requirement for the
OT equipment to comply with industry safety standards. For
example, the regulator for the water industry debunked an
assumption of widespread digitalization across all critical
infrastructure sectors: “There are a small number of prod-
ucts that have to be approved because they’re in contact with
drinking water. For instance, a valve with a computer on the
back of it. It’s not worth approving this valve with the new
computer so you have to use the old computer” [P28]. In
the same interview, he later argued that if the safety regula-
tions remain stringent, OT systems will likely stay, to some
extent, air-gapped, meaning “ultra-safe old-school where you
don’t connect anything” [P28]. We, therefore, recommend
that before falling for the most technologically advanced (and
the most expensive!) security advice, CNI operators ought
to sense-check it against the organization-specific conditions.
Figure 3 demonstrates how this “trope” relates to NIS.
Trope: Separation means security
Analysis: In past, successful attacks on OT were executed in air-gapped 
systems. However, air-gapping is still used in cases where digitization is 
not widespread due to safety regulations. Consultants without the 
specific OT security expertise might not know the difference.
Risk to NIS: Circulation of outdated advice. Pressure to digitize systems 
without concerns for safety first.
NIS Recommendations for CNIs operators: Know about and protect 
yourselves against threats which circumvent air-gapped systems. 
Check whether alternatives to air-gapping comply with safety 
standards.
Figure 3: Analysis of the OT security trope: Separation means
security.
4.2.2 IIoT is inevitable
Tracing the course of innovation further, we observed a
paradox where as many as 11 interviewees would express
worry about IIoT, yet at the same time would say it’s “in-
evitable”. We observed various ways to contribute to pervad-
ing the discourse of “the IIoT inevitability”: from framing
OT cyber security as a challenge to be overcome solely with
technical solutions to treating the socio-political complexi-
ties of IIoT as irrelevant to the participant’s job. Boyd and
Holton [14], in their analysis of innovation discourses, cri-
tiqued the assurances of “inevitability”. They called for an
alternative perspective emphasizing complexity, uncertainty
and the role of power relations. As such, we recommend that
an alternative look at the future of IIoT would ensure that
concerns about security, privacy, affordability, sustainability
and labor losses are jointly addressed before deciding whether
and how IIoT will be present in critical infrastructures.
In terms of NIS implementation, participants flagged a
misalignment between the timescales of IIoT innovation and
policy development: “We’re facing the problem of IIoT ar-
riving. When we did the self-assessment, everyone was using
very traditional industrial control systems. In that time in
the last six months, we’ve all started adopting IIoT and it’s
going to get worse. So, it’s a big change and it’s one that’s
very much on everyone’s radar including mine” [P26]. We
argue that although this is certainly a concern to the industry,
concerns about IIoT also opens up a space to generate critical
inputs into the evolving OT security regulation landscape.
Given that innovation is not technologically determined but
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it’s a result of co-production, mutual shaping between the
society and technology [54, 63], security practitioners are key
stakeholders in the process of IIoT co-production as they have
the agency to raise, publicize and prioritize their concerns.
Figure 4 demonstrates how this trope relates to NIS.
Trope: IIoT is inevitable
Analysis: The discourse of "inevitability" of innovation is consciously 
perpetuated by the IIoT manufacturers. CNI operators and regulators play an 
active role in deciding on the future of innovative technologies.
Risk to NIS: Regulations becoming a vehicle for implementing IIoT for its own 
sake, without concerning security and other public values.
NIS Recommendations for regulators: align the timescales of innovation 
funding, regular upgrades and NIS improvement plans. 
Figure 4: Analysis of the OT security trope: IIoT is inevitable.
4.2.3 Security solutions are the same across the sectors
Another techno-deterministic understanding we observed
among participants is that security solutions do not differ
across the CNI organizations because “the tech basis of cyber
is the same across the sectors” [P09]. However, a closer look
at the CNI operators’ arrangements reveals cross-sectoral dif-
ferences which can be explained by physical constraints and
governance traditions, e.g., “In oil and gas is, the production
facilities, be that an offshore oil platform, are in a small geo-
graphical location, you can’t get onto an offshore oil platform
without getting on to a helicopter. Oil or gas pipelines, on the
other hand, are more like the electricity grid, but they are run
and owned and operated by completely separate companies.
In the water industry, we are unique in so far as we operate
both the production sites and the distribution network, and
the security model is very different for the two” [P26].
The diverse ways practitioners understand the application
of security measures in new contexts raises questions about
the biases they might carry when working across CNI sectors
or across IT and OT systems. If security is a subject to the ma-
terial [4] and regulatory [53] constraints, what is the efficacy
of sharing “best practices” or even a cross-sectoral top-down
directive like NIS? We recommend that initiatives focused
on sharing “best practices” should go beyond talking about
security measures and take time to explain unique organiza-
tional contexts. We hope that, by turning to the diversity of
participants’ experiences, we will able to exemplify the need
for contextuality in OT security policy development. Figure 5
demonstrates how this trope relates to NIS.
Trope: Security solutions are the same 
across the sectors
Analysis: Security "solutions" are contingent on geography, 
organizational structures, safety regulations and financial feasibility.
Risk to NIS: Creation of security industry standards which are not 
sensitive to organizational constraints
NIS Recommendations for CNI operators: When sharing information in 
working groups, don't just share your security practices. Explain the 
context your organization works in.
Figure 5: Analysis of the OT security trope: Security solutions
are the same across the sectors.
4.2.4 Raising awareness leads to security
Mentions of “awareness raising” were present in 15 inter-
views. Participants frequently acknowledged lack of aware-
ness as a key issue in OT Security. They had diverse under-
standing of what constitutes good “awareness” and the like-
lihood of awareness leading to improved protection. While
staff training is one of the deliverables of NIS, we problema-
tize “raising awareness” as an effective educational activity
and encourage practitioners to gain a more nuanced under-
standing of human and organizational factors. The concept of
“awareness raising” has gained popularity through the applica-
tion of the “information deficit model” since the 1980s [65].
The core tenets of the information deficit model are: 1) Igno-
rance is the reason for a lack of support for various issues in
science and technology; 2) Better awareness of science and
technology will lead to the desired societal outcomes (ibid.).
The framework has been discussed in several empirical stud-
ies of cyber security [6, 36, 75]. Information deficit model
received criticisms for proposing that rational and individual
agency is the key determinant for a given action. However, in
the words of an OT Security Consultant, “raising awareness”
might not only fail to bring about positive results, but also
unwittingly deteriorate the state of affairs: “P24: I believe is
that OT cyber security is such a new thing. It’s in the minds
of academia and it’s in the minds of certain people within
essential operating companies. It is not disseminated into the
public awareness either as an employee or as a member of
the public. And it shouldn’t be because general population
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can’t rationalize. They can worry. So why would you want to
worry a population? Is it beneficial for society to know of all
the things that bad people want?”
Going back to the notion of staff training as “raising aware-
ness” of NIS, we found that OT experts had a range of opin-
ions in terms of evidencing that training would work: from
colleagues’ anecdotes, own reviews, to, finally, an increase in
security tickets. In particular, the third notion deserves more
attention: one CNI operator reported that although staff train-
ing successfully raised awareness about security, it looked
like a failure from the outside as it led to an increase in se-
curity incidents being reported. We recommend that for OT
security, the goal of “raising awareness” ought to be reframed
to consider the following questions. First, how do you evi-
dence awareness and security? Second, who should be aware:
IT experts, engineers, board members, manual workers, pol-
icy makers or the general public? Third, what should they
be aware of: technologies, politics, human factors, organiza-
tional issues? Finally, we recommend that “awareness raising”
should be combined with other training methods, e.g. link-
ing security measures to personal values or communicating
operational benefits of security (e.g., improved monitoring,
and asset management). Figure 6 demonstrates how this trope
relates to NIS.
Trope: Raising awareness leads to security
Analysis: While awareness is an important part of security, it does not automatically 
lead to improvements. It is still debated what levels of awareness are sufficient, who 
should receive such training and how to evidence success.
Risks to NIS: Circulation of poorly-evidenced and ineffective training courses. 
NIS Recommendations for CNI operators: Be clear about who should receive the 
training and what are its contents. Do not rely on "awareness" alone - complement it 
with other training methods.
Figure 6: Analysis of the OT Security trope: Raising aware-
ness leads to security.
4.3 Social practices observed
The following section will turn to social practices of NIS
implementation, an uncovered through our qualitative inter-
views. If behaviors are analyzed through the lens of individ-
ual perceptions, motivations and attitudes; both OT security
tropes and practices are examined in relation to power, compe-
tences, meanings and materials [62]. We show that a nuanced
understanding of OT security tropes could contribute to the
construction of well-evidenced and context-specific expertise
and, ultimately, to the adoption of secure practices. However,
as OT security is in the early stage of professionalization,
some of the observed practices could, in fact, undermine the
case for improvements in security through regulations.
Drawing from previous studies on policy classifications [13,
67]we argue that an empirically based exploratory classifica-
tion system could be of use to fellow researchers and prac-
titioners. We classified the policies under high-level themes
to avoid falling into the trap of a formalistic understanding
of law; instead showing that NIS does not happen in vacuum
and is shaped by the environment in which it is implemented.
4.3.1 Classification of practices
We propose an exploratory classification of practices en-
acted as a response to cyber security regulations across critical
infrastructures (Table 4). The aim of our exploratory classifi-
cation is to establish an empirically grounded investigation
into the ’actually existing’ activities rather than idealized
types [68]. As such, we identified four main categories: com-
pliance, workaround, going above and beyond policy remit,
and negotiation. We recognize that this is not an exhaustive
list but, rather, a call for closer examination of the relations
between the stakeholders involved in NIS. We intend that the
classification could be further utilized by security researchers
and practitioners; i.e. they could verify our categories and add
new ones to reflect their experiences.
In creating our classification, we acknowledged previous
work conducted in the field. For example, compliance and
workarounds are well-researched in cyber security [8, 11, 35,
41, 45, 58, 73], however, rarely from the lens of situated prac-
tices [22]. The latter two categories (“going above and beyond
policy remit” and “negotiation”) received less attention in cy-
ber security scholarship (with a notable exception of Slayton
and Clark-Ginsberg [66], Shane [60] and Carr [19]).
Overall, past literature conceptualized compliance and
workarounds as one-way transactions, where a policymaker
sets the rules and a policy recipient responds to them. Mean-
while, we question this static configuration, demonstrating
that in all four categories critical infrastructure operators are
not passive recipients of the policy but its active co-creators.
Consequently, our analysis is focused on relations which make
the acts of policy interpretation and implementation “happen”.
4.3.2 Compliance
We understand compliance as “the act of obeying a formal
cyber security policy”. The topic was extensively studied by
the security community. For example, Gerber et al. [35] inves-
tigated the effectiveness of goal setting and rewards, whereas
Safa et al. [58] and Bauer and Bernroider [8] examined em-
ployees’ attitudes to compliance drawing from the social bond
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Table 4: Practices of policy interpretation and implementation
in the field of OT security.
 Compliance Workaround Going above and 
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assessment 
framework to own 
advantage, while 







Overreliance on the 
latest ‘buzzword’ 
technologies when 




values over public 
values in policy 
interpretation 
(e.g., security at cost 
of privacy) 
 
theory and the theory of reasoned action. Yet, we observe that
compliance is not limited to a mere acceptance of the policy
(expressed by, for example, a positive attitude to it), but it
involves a degree of interpretation.
The NIS Regulations are written in a top-down manner;
therefore, they are not specific to CNI sectors. At the time of
writing, the only sector-specific documents were regulators’
guidelines on completing self-assessment forms. In the eyes
of critical infrastructure operators, NIS requires the operators
to manage assets which not only previously lacked regulations
in terms of security, but also lacked adequate procedures in
other operational areas. As such, some participants admitted
that they need to “get the basics right before thinking about
expensive silver bullets” [P01]. In order to improve the basics
of security, CNI operators ought to record their assets, decide
which ones to deem critical and, then, establish procedures
for management and monitoring: “CNIs don’t necessarily
understand their assets. So, the water industry, for instance,
might have tens of thousands of assets distributed over, 200,
300 square km. Do they know everything about every one of
those assets? Not necessarily because some of them might
have been put in 50, 60 years ago. They might have dropped
off an asset list sometime. They might have come back on. It
might have been refreshed but left there. Who knows? And
they are finding out that the work, that a discovery piece in
their asset management is pretty huge” [P01]
How does one know what counts as a critical asset? We
observed that this decision usually depends on the security
manager’s competences: what if an IT-trained practitioner
included only enterprise IT, excluding cyber-physical infras-
tructures from the scope? Furthermore, our analysis shows
that the processes also differ depending on the organization
type, e.g., participants argued that asset discovery is more chal-
lenging in CNIs with geographically dispersed assets, e.g.,
in the water sector. Finally, we argue that understanding of
asset criticality can be constructed as a way to advance own
career: a security manager could be interpreting the scope
of NIS self-assessment framework to achieve a good score,
while excluding assets which cannot be easily secured. One
participant remarked: “As the self-assessment form is subjec-
tive, it is a reflection of mindsets rather than cyber maturity,
e.g. some companies are adding physical security1 stuff in
their scope and, therefore scoring themselves higher.” [P27].
We link these compliance practices to the trope that “aware-
ness leads to security”. We suggest asking: who should be
aware of what? What assumptions are made about the cur-
rent awareness of policymakers and CNI operators? Should
policymakers be aware of sectoral specifics so they can write
better guidelines? Should security managers (especially if
their role or a whole field is new) be assumed to correctly
assess the policy scope? We recommend that practitioners pay
continuous attention to the idea of “translation” across IT and
OT as well as across the sectors to improve their capabilities
of policy formulation and interpretation.
4.3.3 Workarounds
Workarounds are “circumventions of a cyber security pol-
icy, which do not explicitly address its problems”. Like com-
pliance, workarounds received considerable attention from
the researchers, especially as they tie into the idea of usabil-
ity [11, 73] Kirlappos et al. [41] introduced the term “shadow
security” to describe employees’ unofficial security measures
(some of them of questionable efficacy) devised to ensure
their day-to-day work goals are achieved. Koppel et al. [43]
argued that understanding workarounds requires not only an
analysis of technical rules, but also interviews and observa-
tions of key informants. In our classification of practices as
workarounds, we drew from social scientific understanding
of the term [17], identifying actions which evade security
policies in a non-confrontational manner. Through avoiding
confrontation and applying their own definitions of “appropri-
ate and proportionate measures”, NIS stakeholders are devoid
of an opportunity to negotiate the scope of the policy.
In the context of NIS, some operators were known to im-
plement their own security improvement plans, using NIS as
a “sanity check”. One of the energy regulators argued that
this is a welcome practice since the policy was written in
a basic and generic way: “There are people who are more
confident, or have a different attitude to risk perhaps, and
will have their own views about what is the right thing to do
in their organization, and they might use NIS as a kind of
sanity check, a checklist to see how they compare with it. But
their real logic, decision-making will be based on their expert
knowledge of what they think is the best thing to do in their
circumstances, and they won’t blindly follow NIS” [P02].
Operators could also use workarounds to avoid implement-
ing security measures without the need to openly criticize
1CNI employees traditionally differentiate between cyber security (related
to the protection of personnel and equipment from malicious incidents using
digital technologies), physical security (related to the protection of personnel
and equipment from malicious incidents) and safety (related to the protection
of personnel and equipment from accidents).
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policy, e.g.: “I didn’t enjoy being a CISO because it was al-
ways going into the board saying: “You need to spend money”,
and the board said “Well, why? Prove it, show me metrics,
show me reasons”, and I can scare them with regulations, but
it was never a very scientific question, it was always a bit
finger in the air and, “This is what happens if we don’t do
it, but it might not because we might not get hit”” [P10]. We
note that as the core requirement of NIS is responding in an
“appropriate and proportionate” manner, the policy does not
prescribe risk assessment methodologies or security budgets,
leaving the decision what (not) to secure to the operators.
We link the above “workaround” to the trope “separations
means security”. Here we reiterate the point, that “appropri-
ate and proportionate” interpretation of NIS cannot be simply
assumed as senior decision makers in CNIs might not have
the expertise in the state-of-the-art attack methods. We also
state that relying on outdated measured is not only linked to
the lack of knowledge, but also to organizational hierarchies:
board members might circumvent the policy if it is tied to
activities, they are not willing to take part in. We cannot ig-
nore the dimensions of power relations present in workaround
practices. To better understand how practitioners, construct
the notions of “risk” and “appropriate measures”, we recom-
mend further research asking the following questions: How
is this knowledge negotiated between the board, a CISO and
other employees? How do practitioners know what is “pro-
portionate and appropriate”?
4.3.4 Going above and beyond policy remit
Across the responses to NIS, we noticed that the ambitions
of some critical infrastructure operators exceeded the policy
requirements. We call this category “going above and beyond
the policy remit”. As OT cyber security policies are new, we
did not identify any relevant past research related to this con-
cept. However, we noted that there is a considerable amount
of grey literature on “industry best practices” (e.g., [1, 34]).
While these reports might be detailed and informative, they
lack rigor to be treated as evidence for policymaking.
We identified that certain CNI operators formed working
groups to share progress on NIS and establish a whole-sector
benchmark. We claim that these practices are examples of re-
configurations of power and competence, where the operators
are able to elevate their status through co-operation and shar-
ing capabilities. The existence of working groups questions
the notion of policy implementation as a one-way, passive ac-
tivity. Their evolution will be interesting to observe, especially
as many of CNIs for-profit companies and competitors.
As participants reported, working groups were not required
by the regulators, therefore they tend to be industry-led: “So,
the working group is something has been going on for years
now. We [regulators] are not permanent members. We were
invited, of course, to be part, but this is a closed forum for
operators that is running for years for them to share and
it’s not only about cyber but also about other topics as well
to share and to experience” [P03]. Nevertheless, working
groups are not necessarily uniformly effective. Participants
remarked that the key to success are: the basis of trust, shared
terms of reference and secure storage of confidential data.
An example of a high ambition which does not lead to se-
curity improvements is overreliance on the latest ’buzzword’
technologies when basic knowledge of security is missing. We
noted participants’ fears that some operators can be tempted to
neglect basic improvements in favor of asset upgrades which
they argue as “due to be replaced”. Regulators reported that
the key part of their role to differentiate between legitimate
security improvements and costly innovations for their own
sake: “We want a highly resilient network, so that implies
that you replace these assets before they stop working, and
there’s some subjectivity when that should be. So, there’s an
argument that operators put forward is, we should replace
those assets a bit sooner than previously forecasted and at
the same time we can upgrade the cyber security. So that po-
tentially saves them some money, but it’s hard to draw out the
separation sometimes between the cyber security arguments
and the physical lifetime of the assets, but there are big sums
of money, hundreds of millions.” [P02].
Consequently, we identify that the practices of “going
above and beyond policies” are at risk of falling for the “IIOT
is inevitable” trope. We recommend that security practitioners
are cautious of the promises made by the manufacturers of
innovative technologies. IIoT, machine learning, and “essen-
tial upgrades” are not necessarily inevitable. Furthermore, the
funding mechanisms of critical infrastructures innovations in
the field of security ought to receive a closer scrutiny.
4.3.5 Negotiation
Our final category of Operational Techonology cyber secu-
rity policy response is negotiation. We define it as a “collabo-
rative process, where cyber security stakeholders co-create
the interpretation and implementation of the policy”. Negoti-
ations often involve compromising on conflicting priorities.
Co-production of cyber security expertise was described by
Slayton and Clark-Ginsberg [66] who argued that cyber se-
curity expertise is value-laden and it can contribute to “reg-
ulatory capture”, a situation where regulation serves private
interests rather than the public good. Furthermore, Carr [19]
analyzed the private-public partnerships forming in the UK
and the U.S. Her paper identified a disconnect between the
expectations of the public and private sector stakeholders in
terms of roles, responsibilities and power. These influential
papers are one of the few high-level empirical works in the
field of cyber security governance. Here we complement their
findings by outlining the details of stakeholders’ configura-
tions and practices on the ground.
One example of negotiation is the practice of the operators
and regulators working together to improve the language of
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NIS guidelines and self-assessment forms. In the following
quote, an OT security manager busts the myth that “security
measures are the same across the sectors”. He reports: “one
of my big bugbears with the OT cyber security policies is that
they are info sec driven. I prefer to use the term “cybersecurity”
because information isn’t the asset. Traditionally, forget the
computer systems. I start with something I say to everybody.
There are two fundamental differences between information
security and OT security. Number one is that the computer
system is just another component in the mechanical plant
in my world. So, it has no more importance than a pump
or a valve. If it breaks, the plant stops working (. . . ) So the
regulator looked for two water companies to work with them
last year to develop NIS into something workable for the water
industry. They brought out draft guidance and I sat down with
them for a day, and I went through some of the things which
just don’t work and there’s a big difference.” [P26]
In negotiating how to improve security through NIS
through the emerging working groups and public-private part-
nerships, there is a risk that a significant influence of private
sector over policy interpretation could lead to prioritizing
business values over public values. As the most cyber-mature
operators establish close relationships with the regulators, pol-
icymakers ought to remain objective and avoid biases during
audits and funding competitions. To complement that, CNI
operators ought to improve their capabilities in the areas of
human and social factors of technology, so they while imple-
menting NIS, they do not compromise on other public values
such as privacy, sustainability or equity.
4.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
NIS DIRECTIVE
Based on the analysis of OT security tropes in conjunc-
tion with our mapping of policy implementation practices, we
proved a set of five policy recommendations for NIS stake-
holders in the UK and other European countries. We outline
these below mirroring the order of research findings in earlier
sections and specifying the target audience for each.
Recommendation 1 (for CNIs operators deciding on im-
provement plans): Know about and protect yourselves against
threats which circumvent air-gapped systems. Check whether
alternatives to air-gapping comply with safety standards.
Recommendation 2 (for regulatory bodies overseeing NIS):
Align the timescales of innovation funding, regular upgrades
and NIS improvement plans. When approving price reviews
for network upgrades, seek robust evidence for the claims on
the operational benefits of proposed innovations.
Recommendation 3 (for CNI operators responsible for cy-
ber security training): Tie the training to employees’ personal
concerns to make it relatable and interesting. Do not rely on
"awareness" alone - complement it with other training meth-
ods. Above all, place “awareness” in the usability context of
daily work; i.e. plant supervisors have different concerns to
admin staff.
Recommendation 4 (for all stakeholders) Practitioners
should pay continuous attention to the idea of “translation”
across IT and OT as well as across the sectors to improve their
capabilities of policy formulation and interpretation. This will
ensure that the scope and latter auditing of NIS pertains both
OT and IT and that the improvements are tailored to each
system.
Recommendation 5 (for all stakeholders) We recommend
that security practitioners ought to improve their capabilities
in the areas of human and social factors of technology, so they
while implementing NIS, they do not compromise on other
public values such as privacy, sustainability or equity.
5 Conclusions
The Network and Information Systems Security (NIS) Di-
rective is the first European-scale attempt to establish a high
standard of cybersecurity among the operators of critical in-
frastructures. In order to understand whether it is likely to
bring about a meaningful organizational change and avoid
becoming a tick-box exercise, we interviewed 30 UK-based
cyber security practitioners inquiring about their experiences
of policy implementation.
Our analysis found that the emerging field of Operational
Technology (OT) Security is yet to formulate norms, stan-
dards and career trajectories. We ought to be careful that “OT
security tropes” are appropriately scrutinized before serving
as policy advice. Furthermore, our study proposed a classifi-
cation of cyber security practices which maps the diversity of
policy responses to NIS. We analyzed OT security practices
through the lens of OT security tropes to indicate whether
they could lead to more security or insecurity. As such, we
observed that the process of NIS implementation is a two-way
exchange. We provided empirical examples of the practices of
negotiation and going above and beyond policy remit which
illustrate this point. Similarly, we argue that compliance with
NIS might not be reduced to a tick-box exercise if practition-
ers are reflective about “OT security tropes” circulating in the
field. Practices most likely to bring about meaningful orga-
nizational change are appropriately situated in the OT and
sector-specific context and aligned with cross-cutting public
values (e.g. security, privacy, sustainability and equity).
From a research point of view, our findings recommend
that the funding mechanisms of CNI innovations in the field
of security ought to receive closer scrutiny, and that further re-
search should be done to better understand how practitioners
construct the notions of “risk” and “appropriate and propor-
tionate measures”.
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A Codebook
Below are given per theme, the individual codes reported




Description: The act of obeying a formal cyber security
policy likely to improve security.
Example: “CNIs don’t necessarily understand their assets,
per se. So, the water industry, for instance, might have
tens of thousands of assets distributed over, 200, 300
square km. Do they know everything about every one
of those assets? Not necessarily because some of them
might have been put in 50, 60 years ago. They might
have dropped off an asset list sometime. They might
have come back on. It might have been refreshed but
left there. Who knows? And they are finding out that the
work, that a discovery piece in their asset management
is pretty huge”
Compliance, insecure
Description: The act of obeying a formal cyber security
policy likely to deteriorate security.
Example: “As the self-assessment form is subjective, it is a
reflection of mindsets rather than actual cyber maturity,
for example some companies are adding physical secu-
rity stuff in their scope and, therefore scoring themselves
higher
Workaround, secure
Description: Circumventions of a cyber security policy
which do not explicitly address its problems; likely to
improve security.
Example: "“There are people who are more confident, or
have a different attitude to risk perhaps, and will have
their own views about what is the right thing to do in
their organization, and they might use NIS as a kind of
sanity check, a checklist to see how they compare with
it. But their real logic, decision-making will be based
on their expert knowledge of what they think is the best
thing to do in their circumstances, and they won’t blindly
follow NIS”"
Workaround, insecure
Description: Circumventions of a cyber security policy
which do not explicitly address its problems; likely to
deteriorate security.
Example: “I didn’t enjoy being a CISO because it was always
going into the board saying: “You need to spend money”,
and the board were, like, “Well, why? Prove it, show me
metrics, show me reasons”, and I can scare them with
regulations, but it was never a very scientific question, so
to speak, it was always a bit finger in the air and, “This is
what happens if we don’t do it, but it might not because
we might not get hit”
Above and Beyond, secure
Description: The act of exceeding the policy requirements;
likely to improve security.
Example: “So, the working group is something has been go-
ing on for years now. We [regulators] are not permanent
members. We were invited, of course, to be part, but this
is a closed forum for operators that is running for years
for them to share and it’s not only about cyber but also
about other topics as well to share and to experience”
Above and Beyond, insecure
Description: The act of exceeding the policy requirements;
likely to deteriorate security.
Example: "“We want a highly resilient, highly available net-
work, so that implies that you replace these assets before
they stop working, and there’s some subjectivity when
that should be. So, there’s an argument that operators put
forward is, well, perhaps we should replace those assets
a bit sooner than previously forecasted and at the same
time we can upgrade the cybersecurity of the sensors or
activators within these devices. So that potentially saves
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them some money, but it’s hard to draw out the sepa-
ration sometimes between the cybersecurity arguments
and the physical lifetime of the assets, but there are big
sums of money"" hundreds of millions.”"
Negotiation, secure
Description: Collaborative process, where cyber security
stakeholders co-create the interpretation and implemen-
tation of the policy; likely to improve security.
Example: “one of my big bugbears with the OT cybersecu-
rity policies is that they are very info sec driven. That’s
why I prefer to use the term “cybersecurity” because
information isn’t the asset. Traditionally, forget the com-
puter systems. I start with something I say to everybody.
There are two fundamental differences between infor-
mation security and cybersecurity, OT security. Number
one is that the computer system is just another compo-
nent in the mechanical plant in my world. So, it has no
more importance than a pump or a valve or whatever. If
it breaks, the plant stops working (. . . ) So the regulator
looked for two water companies to work with them last
year to develop NIS into something workable for the
water industry. They brought out draft guidance and I
sat down with them for a day, and I went through some
of the things which just don’t work and there’s a big
difference.”
Negotiation, insecure
Description: Collaborative process, where cyber security
stakeholders co-create the interpretation and implemen-
tation of the policy; likely to deteriorate security.
Example: "if you have several suppliers, you can actually
have competitive discussions with the suppliers. If you
actually use one supplier only, you don’t have that any-
more. One of the problems we’re having in the railways
on the signalling side is that we’re having less and less
suppliers and so the costs are spiralling because the sup-
plier knows we don’t have any other options."
A.2 Clichés
Separation means security
Description: Comments on air-gapping.
Example: “When you’re talking to the board and they say,
“We don’t need to worry about security because our pro-
duction facility is airgapped”, there is only one place
which is air gapped and that is Battlestar Galactica!”
IIOT is inevitable
Description: Comments on the trajectory and pace of inno-
vation.
Example: "We’re facing the problem of IIOT arriving. When
we did the self-assessment, everyone was using very
traditional industrial control systems. In that time in the
last six months, we’ve all started adopting IIOT and it’s
going to get worse. So, it’s a big change and it’s one
that’s very much on everyone’s radar including mine”
Solutions are the same across sectors
Description: Comments on sectoral differences and similari-
ties
Example: “the tech basis of cyber is the same across the
sectors”
Raising awareness leads to security
Description: Comments on the value of awareness raising
activities.
Example: "General population can’t rationalize. They can
worry. So why would you want to worry a population?




Description: Participants’ education and previous roles.
Example: “worked in cyber security back when there was
no such thing as cyber security”
Talk
Description: Discourses of participants.
Example: “Virtually, you could look at every outcome in
the self assessment framework and have a debate about
whether you’ve met it or not, purely on the basis of what
sort of attacks do we expect to defend against. The frame-
work doesn’t take a position on that. So when every-
thing’s subjective, the decisions are made, are all largely
made ultimately on personal opinions and it’s hard to
summarize, hard to understand from that just what at-
tacks they are designed to be resilient against and what
they aren’t. Whereas if you have a standards based ap-
proach, standards on their own aren’t the full solution,
but I think they’re part of the solution. Things like the
[government cyber security] standard, which government
has promoted. I don’t know if you’re aware of that.”
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